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The index is exiguous, giving only names of men and places. On the other hand the general bibliography as well as the special bibliographies for each division are up to date and selected with discrimination and judgment. A notable exception occurs in the omission of Mahan's works. Indeed a little familiarity with Mahan would have been a safeguard against speaking of the United States as an ally of Napoleon—"mit Napoleon im Bunde" (p. 201). It would also have secured more adequate treatment of the Baltic trade and its part in disrupting the system of Napoleon, thereby leading to the final catastrophe of which Wahl himself says, "Der Untergang der Grossen Armee in Russland ist das für die politischen Verhältnisse des Kontinents entscheidende Ereignis des ganzen Zeitalters" (p. 220). But in spite of certain objections, which a volume raising so many polemical questions is sure to occasion, the fact remains that the work has exceptional merit, adequately filling the place for which it was intended.

WILLIAM E. LINGELBACH.

*A History of the Peninsular War.* By CHARLES OMAN, M.A., Hon. LL.D. Volume IV. December, 1810–December, 1811. *Masséna's Retreat; Fuentes de Oñoro; Albuera; Tarragona.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1911. Pp. xiv, 664.)

THE painstaking scholarship and the keenness of critical ability displayed in the successive volumes of Professor Oman's masterpiece assure it a place among the most notable contributions to the history of the Napoleonic era. The reader may continue to turn to the more glowing pages of Napier, but the student will consult Oman for the most scrupulously accurate account based upon the most complete researches. The literature and the archives of England, France, Spain, and Portugal have been worked through, valuable manuscripts in family archives have been ferreted out, such as the papers of D'Urban, Beresford's chief-of-staff, and of Scovell, Wellington's cipher-secretary; and nearly every important scene of action has been travelled over. With convincing certainty, Napier is corrected, the memoirs of Thiébault and Marbot are proved glowingly inaccurate, Masséna's chief-of-staff, Fririon, and his biographer, Koch, are repeatedly brought to book; and the despatches of the emperor himself are checked by the cold facts. Sixteen excellent maps and plans, abundant foot-notes, twenty-four appendixes of minutely accurate data of numbers engaged and lost, a good index, and marvelously careful proof-reading, testify to the indefatigable thoroughness of research and lavish care in the book-making by both author and publisher.

Abundant attention is given to the captures of Tortosa and Tarragona by Suchet, of Figueras by Macdonald, to the English attempt to break up Victor's siege of Cadiz by the battle of Barrosa, and to the multitude of minor operations, of which the most brilliant was Hill's

destruction of Girard's division at Arroyo dos Molinos. The main interest, however, is rightly centred on Wellington's recovery of Portugal, Masséna's retreat from Santarem to Salamanca, his attempt to redeem himself at Fuentes de Oñoro, and his supersession by Marmont, the campaigns of Soult in Estremadura with the three sieges of Badajoz and the dearly won victory of Beresford at Albuera, and the deadlocks near Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo during the latter half of the year mark the transfer of the offensive from the French to the English which was signalized by Wellington's capture of Ciudad Rodrigo which opened his victorious campaign of 1812.

In the year 1811 the Napoleonic power was apparently at dead centre. It is the least eventful year of the epoch, for Napoleon at forty-two, after fifteen years of ceaseless activity, seems to have given himself a sabbatical year. The empire was at its widest extent; the Napoleonic system, now in full working order in both army and civil service, was left to the charge of subordinates; England alone, as in 1798, in 1801, and in 1808, stubbornly contested its supremacy; the birth of the King of Rome on March 20 was the moment of supreme ecstasy. Ten days later the knell had sounded, for in this year England was at last able to pit its armies against those of Napoleon, and Foy had brought the news of Masséna's retreat from Santarem. The emperor's comment on the news forestalled the inevitable question: "*Le Portugal est trop loin: je ne peux pas y aller; il faudrait six mois. Pendant six mois tout est suspendu: l'Europe est sans direction: les Russes peuvent se déclarer, les Anglais débarquer au nord.*"

The political situation was the key to the war, and this Professor Oman has admirably elucidated in the chapter on King Joseph and his Troubles. As the Russian campaign and the conspiracy of General Malet proved in the next year, the burden of empire required the emperor at the capital. Without the railroad he could not go to Portugal, and without the telegraph he could not properly direct operations there. His orders were six weeks out of date when they reached Marmont or Soult. Joseph could not be given independent responsibility, and no marshal was competent for the supreme command. Six independent, jealous commanders directed the operations of the 350,000 troops in the Peninsula. Napoleon, says Oman, "never thoroughly comprehended the way in which the movements of his armies were delayed by the fact that they were moving in a country where every peasant was their enemy, where provisions could only be collected by armed force, and where no despatch would reach its destination unless it were guarded by an escort of from 50 to 250 men. . . . Wellington . . . had written as early as 1809 that the enemy could not turn him out of the Peninsula with anything less than 100,000 men, and that he could make such arrangements that an army of that number could not live in the country." The retreat of Masséna, and the failure of the attempted combinations of Soult and Marmont before Badajoz, and of

Marmont and Dorsenne before Ciudad Rodrigo proved Wellington's point.

When the campaign of 1812 opened, Wellington for the first time had the whip-hand, with results no less ruinous for Napoleon than the Russian blunder. Professor Oman's fifth volume covering the climax of the war will be awaited with impatient interest.

GEORGE MATTHEW DUTCHER.

*Constitutional History of England since the Accession of George the Third.* By the Right Honorable Sir THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, K.C.B., D.C.L., edited and continued to 1911 by FRANCIS HOLLAND. In three volumes. (London, New York, Bombay, and Calcutta: Longmans, Green, and Company. 1912. Pp. xvi, 468; xiii, 441; xvii, 398.)

IN the title above, volumes I. and II. comprise what has been known for many years as May's *Constitutional History of England, 1760-1860*. The text, except for a few additional notes by the editor, is Lord Farnborough's last revision of his original work. Volume III. is the "continuation" by Holland, and covers the period, 1860-1911.

The appearance of a work in this form raises a question in the ethics of continuations. It will be admitted that a monastic chronicle, an annual register, or a series of law reports are capable of being continued. Can the same process be applied to an author? Now to students of historical literature, May's *Constitutional History* is not a colorless, impersonal compilation, but the work of a distinctive author; and even though its substantive value should depreciate, it will remain, probably for some generations, a pleasing monument of early-Victorian Whiggery. As such, it deserved to be left by itself. However justifiable the motives of the publishers, or of Mr. Holland, may be in presuming to put out a continuation, the result cannot be deprecated too strongly as a display of literary violence from which Lord Farnborough might have been spared. Far better would it be for Mr. Holland to have written independently, and to have offered us for the period a separate work of his own, free from the ambiguous association of a great name.

The reasons for urging a criticism on these grounds are more than formal: they are based upon the evident lack of a common purpose between Lord Farnborough and his "continuator". Lord Farnborough, eminently judicial and moderate, wrote with great care for scholars and students: Mr. Holland, with the clever touch of a journalist, almost disdainful foot-notes and citations, writes for the general reader. He thus places himself not only in striking contrast to his predecessor, but also beyond the range of serious critics.

This aside, however, his work has certain very conspicuous merits. It is not only well, but even brilliantly written: some of the single par-